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게임이론: 전략과 정보의 경제학(제11판)
개정판
게임이론: 전략과 정보의 경제학(제11판)
저자
김영세
역자
-
분야
경제학 ▷ 미시/거시/국제경제
출판사
박영사
발행일
2025.08.28
장정
양장
페이지
692P
판형
사륙배판
ISBN
979-11-303-2258-2
부가기호
93320
강의자료다운
-
색도
2도
정가
35,000원

제11판 2025.08.28

제10판 2022.03.25

제9판 2020.04.10

제8판 2018. 3. 2
중판 2016. 9. 15
제7판 2015. 8. 31
제6판 2013. 7. 15
제5판 2011. 2. 25.
제4판 2008. 9. 5. 제3판 2002. 8. 30.
개정판 2000. 8. 20. 초판 1998. 8. 30.

이번 전면개정판의 가장 큰 변화는 이전 판본에서 기초 개념을 개괄적으로 설명하는 데 그쳤던 협조게임이론을 제6편의 세 장으로 독립시켜 깊이 있게 다루었다는 것이다. 구체적으로 협조적 협상해, 연합형 게임에서의 대표적 해 개념인 코어와 섀플리값, 사회선호함수와 애로우의 불가능성 정리, 사회선택함수와 그 응용 사례인 투표 제도, 미비정보하에서 사회선택함수와 기버드·새터스웨이트 불가능성 정리, 메커니즘 설계를 통한 사회선택의 구현, 쌍방 매칭 등이다.

연습문제 해답, 부록, 참고문헌은 본책에서 분리하여 QR코드로 링크하여 다운로드 받도록 하였다. 또한 본판 인쇄 이후 찾아낸 오탈자의 정오표를 수시로 업데이트하여 QR코드로 스캔하도록 하였다.

본서를 두 학기에 나누어 강의할 경우 가이드라인은 다음과 같다. 가칭 게임이론Ⅰ》에서는 제1~11, 14장을 다루되 시간이 허락하면 제12장 경매이론과 제15장의 경제학적 응용도 다루기를 권한다. 또 다른 과목 가칭 게임이론Ⅱ》 혹은 정보 및 게임이론에서는 제1, 22.1~2.3, 3, 5, 11~19장을 학습한다. 후자를 학습하기 위해 전자를 선수할 필요는 없고 두 과목 따로 학습해도 무방하다. 본서를 한 학기 과목으로 강의할 경우 제1~3, 5~8, 10~15장은 필수적으로 다루되 나머지 내용은 독자의 선호와 필요에 따라 취사선택하면 된다.

저자가 1998년 졸저를 통해 게임이론을 국내에 소개한 이후 열 차례의 개정을 거쳐왔다. 개정판마다 선진 학문의 연구 결과와 추세를 반영함은 물론 국내 경제사회 현상의 설명에 적용하고자 미력이나마 최선을 다하였다. 나름의 의미 를 간직하고자 모든 판본들의 머리말을 QR코드에 링크해 둔다.

연세대학교 게임이론과 응용, 정보 및 게임이론, 정치 및 공공경제수업에서 예리한 지적과 질문으로 강의록의 수준을 높여준 제자들, 꼼꼼하게 교정 작업을 수행해 준 조교 김성래, 김명규, 선윤승, 최도현, 그리고 박영사의 조성호 기획이사와 편집부 탁종민 과장에게 감사한다. 강호제위의 지속적인 지도편달과 조언을 부탁드린다.

 

아름다운 연세의 교정에서

20258

김 영 세

 

저자 김영세(Youngse Kim)는 미국 캘리포니아대학(UCLA)에서 경제학박사 학위를 취득하고 영국 케임브리지대학교와 런던대학교에서 교수로 재직한 후 귀국하여 현재 연세대학교 교수로 재직하고 있다. 국내외 저명 학술지에 수십 편의 학술논문 게재는 물론 산업조직, 공정거래, 경영전략, 정치경제와 관련된 정부 정책보고서와 기업 컨설팅보고서를 50여 편 출간하였다. 저서로는 미시경제학(1998, 세경사, 공저), 전략과 정보(2, 2002, 박영사), 게임의 기술(2007, 웅진지식하우스), 공공경제론(2019, 청람)이 있다. 연구와 교육 그리고 현실경제에의 공헌을 인정받아 연세학술상(1998), 매경이코노미스트상(2003), 초헌학술상(2005), 기획재정부장관표창(2008), 매경특별표창(2015) 등을 수상하였다.

 

 

들어가며

1 게임이론이란 무엇인가? ························································· 001

2 게임이론의 역사와 발전 ·························································· 003

 

SECTION 01 전략과 경쟁

CHAPTER 01 게임의 형태와 해

1.1 게임의 구성요소 ··································································· 011

1.2 게임의 형태 ········································································· 018

1.2.1 전 개 형 / 018

1.2.2 전 략 형 / 020

1.3 게임의 해 ··········································································· 022

1.4 우월전략과 열등전략 ····························································· 023

1.5 열등전략의 단계적 소거 ························································· 028

1.6 순수전략 내쉬균형 ································································ 032

1.7 여러 2×2 전략형게임 ··························································· 036

 

CHAPTER 02 전략형게임의 응용

2.1 생산량경쟁 과점시장 ··························································· 042

2.1.1 간단한 예시 / 042

2.1.2 쿠르노 복점모형 / 044

2.1.3 쿠르노 과점모형 / 049

2.2 가격경쟁 과점시장 ································································ 051

2.2.1 동질적 재화 / 051

2.2.2 차별화된 과점 / 053

2.2.3 엡손(Epson)의 부메랑 / 055

2.3 제품 차별화 ········································································· 057

2.3.1 호텔링 모형 / 057

2.3.2 민주 선거 및 중위투표자정리 / 060

2.4 공유지의 비극 ······································································ 063

2.5 공조게임과 네트워크산업 ······················································· 071

2.5.1 네트워크효과 / 071

2.5.2 포지티브 피드백 / 073

2.5.3 공조게임 / 075

2.6 공조게임과 케인즈 경기변동론 ················································ 080

2.7 손해배상법 ·········································································· 083

 

CHAPTER 03 혼합전략의 개념과 응용

3.1 강단계소거와 합리화전략 ······················································· 087

3.2 혼합전략 내쉬균형 ································································ 090

3.2.1 순수전략 내쉬균형의 부존재 가능성 / 090

3.2.2 혼합전략 내쉬균형의 계산 / 091

3.2.3 혼합전략 내쉬균형의 성질 / 093

3.3 백화점의 바겐세일 ································································ 096

3.4 가위바위보 ·········································································· 099

3.5 정치경제적 소모전 ································································ 102

3.6 투표의 역설과 중추투표가설 ··················································· 107

3.6.1 양 후보 지지자들의 수가 같은 km의 경우 / 108

3.6.2 후보 B 지지자들이 후보 A 지지자들보다 많은 km의 경우 / 109

 

CHAPTER 04 내쉬균형의 성질과 대안

4.1 내쉬균형과 강단계소거의 관계 ················································ 116

4.2 최소극대와 최대극소 ····························································· 120

4.2.1 안전성과 최소극대 / 120

4.2.2 최대극소 / 122

4.2.3 혼합전략 최소극대 및 최대극소 / 123

4.3 최소극대, 최대극소, 내쉬균형의 관계 ········································ 125

4.4 여행자의 딜레마·································································· 128

4.5 초점과 위험우위 ··································································· 131

4.5.1 초 점 / 132

4.5.2 위험우위와 보수우위 / 134

4.6 진화게임(evolutionary game) ················································ 137

4.6.1 학습, 진화, 경로의존성 / 137

4.6.2 진화안정적 균형 / 139

4.6.3 동태적 진화안정성 / 142

4.7 혼합전략 내쉬균형의 직관성 ··················································· 145

4.8 상관균형 ············································································ 146

 

SECTION 02 공약과 신빙성

CHAPTER 05 전개형게임

5.1 전개형게임 ·········································································· 155

5.1.1 전개형의 개념과 특징 / 155

5.1.2 전개형과 전략형의 관계 / 157

5.1.3 행태전략 / 159

5.2 위협과 약속의 신빙성 ···························································· 161

5.3 부분게임완전균형과 역진귀납법 ·············································· 164

5.4 역진귀납법과 완전균형의 현실성 ············································· 167

5.5 전략적 공약 ········································································· 171

5.5.1 내구재 독점판매 / 171

5.5.2 듀폰의 생산용량 확장 / 173

5.6 공약의 신빙성을 높이는 방안 ·················································· 178

5.6.1 자신의 손을 묶음으로써 신빙성을 높이는 방안 / 178

5.6.2 보수의 구조를 바꿈으로써 공약의 신빙성을 높이는 방안 / 181

 

CHAPTER 06 전개형게임의 응용

6.1 선점효과가 있는 과점시장 ······················································ 185

6.1.1 스타켈버그 과점 모형 / 186

6.1.2 선도-추종 관계 / 189

6.2 뱅크런 금융공황 ··································································· 191

6.2.1 뱅크런의 자기실현적 성질 / 191

6.2.2 예금보험제도를 통한 신뢰성 회복 / 194

6.3 소비자 예속 ········································································· 196

6.3.1 전환비용과 소비자 예속 / 196

6.3.2 벨아틀랜틱의 AT&T 교환기 설치 / 197

6.3.3 기타 사례들 / 199

6.4 전략적 무역정책 ··································································· 201

6.5 지리적 입지선정 및 가격결정 ·················································· 210

 

CHAPTER 07 협상과 중재

7.1 유한수명 협상 ······································································ 218

7.2 최후통첩협상, 독재자게임 및 공평정의 ······································ 226

7.3 무한수명 협상 ······································································ 231

7.4 협상지연, 파업, 결렬과 미비정보의 역할 ···································· 237

7.5 중 재 ················································································· 239

7.5.1 일반중재 / 239

7.5.2 최종제안중재 / 240

 

SECTION 03 반복과 협조

CHAPTER 08 반복게임

8.1 보복, 보상 및 협조 ································································ 249

8.2 반복게임의 요소와 균형 ························································· 250

8.2.1 역사와 전략 / 250

8.2.2 반복게임에서 보수 개념 / 253

8.2.3 반복게임 균형 / 255

8.3 유한반복게임 ······································································· 256

8.3.1 유한반복 죄수의 딜레마 게임 / 256

8.3.2 다수의 내쉬균형을 갖는 게임의 유한반복 / 260

8.4 재협상방지 ·········································································· 265

8.5 무한반복 죄수의 딜레마 ························································· 269

8.5.1 반복게임 전략 / 269

8.5.2 내쉬균형 / 272

8.5.3 부분게임완전균형 / 275

8.6 팃포탯의 이론과 실례 ···························································· 278

8.6.1 균형 분석 / 278

8.6.2 팃포탯의 실례 / 281

 

CHAPTER 09 전래정리

9.1 사회적 실현가능성 및 개인적 합리성 ········································ 285

9.2 무한반복게임의 내쉬균형 ······················································· 290

9.3 무한반복게임의 부분게임완전균형 ··········································· 291

9.4 유한반복게임의 내쉬균형 ······················································· 294

9.5 다양한 예시 ········································································· 296

 

CHAPTER 10 반복게임의 응용

10.1 카 르 텔 ············································································ 301

10.1.1 생산량카르텔 / 301

10.1.2 가격카르텔 / 305

10.2 불완전정보하의 담합 ··························································· 308

10.3 담합과 카르텔의 실례 ·························································· 312

10.3.1 OPEC의 담합과 국제유가 / 312

10.3.2 다이아몬드는 영원히 / 315

10.3.3 가격선도 / 318

10.3.4 유통전략을 통한 경쟁제한 / 321

10.3.5 자진신고자 감면 제도 / 323

10.4 실효임금과 생산성 향상 ······················································· 325

10.4.1 실효임금이론 / 325

10.4.2 실효임금이론의 응용 / 331

10.5 정책의 비일관성과 정부 신뢰 ················································ 335

 

SECTION 04 정보와 제도

CHAPTER 11 정태적 미비정보 게임

11.1 서 론 ············································································· 345

11.2 베이즈게임 및 균형의 개념 ··················································· 348

11.2.1 정태적 미비정보 게임 / 348

11.2.2 베이즈내쉬균형 / 350

11.3 변형된 투자진입게임 ························································ 351

11.4 생산비에 대한 미비정보하의 쿠르노 복점모형 ··························· 357

11.5 공공재 건설게임 ································································· 361

11.6 정보우위는 반드시 유익한가? ················································ 366

11.7 근사주지사실과 미비정보게임 ················································ 368

11.7.1 협공(coordinated attack) / 368

11.7.2 동전 테두리의 톱니문양 / 369

11.7.3 흙투성이 꼬마들 / 370

11.7.4 봉투교환게임(envelope exchange) / 373

11.7.5 투기거래의 불가능성 / 376

 

CHAPTER 12 경 매

12.1 개 요 ············································································· 381

12.2 사적가치 경매 ···································································· 387

12.2.1 영국식 경매 / 388

12.2.2 차가 경매 / 390

12.2.3 최고가 경매 / 392

12.2.4 네덜란드식 경매 / 398

12.3 수익동등정리와 효율성 ························································ 399

12.4 공통가치 경매와 승자의 저주 ················································ 403

12.5 위험회피 성향이 미치는 영향 ················································ 409

12.6 입찰담합 ··········································································· 411

12.7 부록 A: 최고가 입찰 균형 전략의 성질 ···································· 415

 

CHAPTER 13 메커니즘의 설계

13.1 개 요 ············································································· 419

13.2 고객차별화의 단순모형 ························································ 424

13.2.1 여객기의 좌석등급 / 424

13.2.2 기업의 최적전략 / 426

13.3 고객차별화의 일반모형 ························································ 430

13.3.1 개요 / 430

13.3.2 고객차별화의 실례 / 432

13.3.3 일반 모형 / 434

13.4 공공재 건설을 위한 그로브스-레드야드 메커니즘 ······················ 440

13.4.1 단순 예시 / 440

13.4.2 일반모형 / 442

13.4.3 메커니즘 이행의 신빙성 / 444

13.5 배타적 유통 계약 ································································ 446

13.6 메커니즘 설계와 현시원리 ···················································· 449

13.6.1 메커니즘 설계 / 449

13.6.2 현시원리 / 452

 

SECTION 05 신호, 선별, 계약

CHAPTER 14 동태적 미비정보 게임

14.1 문제의 제기 ······································································· 459

14.2 완전베이즈균형 ·································································· 461

14.3 완전베이즈균형의 계산 예 ···················································· 466

14.4 동태적 미비정보 게임 ·························································· 469

14.5 신호게임 ··········································································· 473

14.5.1 신호게임의 정의 / 473

14.5.2 신호게임에서 완전베이즈균형 / 476

14.6 민사소송에서 상호 합의 ······················································· 479

14.7 평 판 ············································································· 485

14.8 직관적 신념과 전진귀납법 ···················································· 490

14.8.1 독점기업의 진입제한가격 부과게임 / 490

14.8.2 외부대안이 있는 성대결게임 / 494

 

CHAPTER 15 역선택, 신호와 선별

15.1 자동차 품질보증과 비싼 광고 ················································ 498

15.1.1 미비정보가 시장실패에 미치는 영향 / 498

15.1.2 품질보증, 광고, 브랜드가치 / 500

15.2 학력 인플레이션의 순기능 ···················································· 506

15.3 금융시장의 역선택, 신용할당 및 재무구조 ································ 519

15.3.1 역선택과 신용할당 / 520

15.3.2 신호발송으로서의 지분 제안 / 526

15.4 다양한 보험상품과 소비자 선택 ············································· 534

15.4.1 보험을 통한 위험분산 / 534

15.4.2 모 형 / 535

15.4.3 역선택과 시장실패 / 538

15.4.4 보험상품의 다양화 / 541

 

CHAPTER 16 대리인 문제와 유인계약

16.1 감춰진 행동과 도덕적 해이 ··················································· 547

16.2 단순 모형 ·········································································· 551

16.2.1 불완전정보와 도덕적 해이 / 551

16.2.2 유인계약 / 553

16.2.3 고정급이 성과급보다 우월한 경우 / 557

16.3 최적 계약: 위험분담과 유인제공 ············································ 560

16.4 일반화된 대리인 모형 ·························································· 563

16.4.1 완전정보하의 자원배분 / 564

16.4.2 불완전정보하의 유인설계 / 565

16.5 토너먼트 경쟁 ···································································· 572

16.5.1 완전정보하의 자원배분 / 572

16.5.2 불완전정보하의 유인계약 / 574

16.6 공동생산 체제와 주인의 역할 ················································ 578

16.7 유인설계와 경제제도 ··························································· 584

16.7.1 경영자 보수와 기업 소유지배구조 / 584

16.7.2 징세청부제와 세무공무원제 / 589

 

 

SECTION 06 협조게임과 사회선택

CHAPTER 17 협조적 게임이론

17.1 협조적 협상 ······································································· 595

17.2 협조적 협상해 ···································································· 598

17.3 연합형 게임 ······································································· 600

17.4 코어 ················································································· 602

17.5 섀플리값 ··········································································· 604

17.5.1 개념과 공식 / 605

17.5.2 섀플리값의 성질 / 608

17.6 권력지수 ··········································································· 609

17.6.1 섀플리-슈빅 권력지수 / 609

17.6.2 반자프-콜먼 권력지수 / 611

 

CHAPTER 18 사회선호와 사회선택

18.1 사회적 선호 ······································································· 613

18.2 애로우의 불가능성 정리 ······················································· 614

18.2.1 애로우의 공리 / 614

18.2.2 불가능성 정리 / 616

18.3 사회적 선택 ······································································· 619

18.3.1 사회선택함수 / 619

18.3.2 콩도르세의 역설 / 621

18.4 투표 제도 ·········································································· 624

18.4.1 최다득표제 / 624

18.4.2 점수투표제 / 626

18.4.3 승인투표제 / 629

18.4.4 결선투표제 / 630

18.5 형사재판 제도와 피의자의 운명 ············································· 632

 

CHAPTER 19 미비정보하의 사회선택

19.1 기버드-새터스웨이트 불가능성 정리 ······································ 635

19.2 메커니즘 설계를 통한 사회선택의 구현 ···································· 641

19.3 안정적 매칭 ······································································· 646

19.3.1 매칭에 의한 자원배분 / 646

19.3.2 안정적 매칭 / 648

19.4 게일-섀플리 알고리즘 ························································· 650

19.5 매칭간의 비교 및 전략적 조작 ··············································· 654

19.5.1 매칭간의 비교 / 654

19.5.2 전략적 조작 / 654

 

찾아보기 ························································································ 657